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9Abstract Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at
10capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading
11accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I
12argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is
13strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication
14on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that
15I see as offering an alternative route to shared intention. I concentrate on Michael
16Bacharach’s version of team-agency theory, according to which shared agency is
17a matter of team-reasoning, team-reasoning depends on group identification and
18group identification is the result of processes of self-framing. I argue that it can
19yield an account of shared intention that is less normatively loaded and less
20cognitively demanding.
211 Introduction
22In this paper I try to strike a middle ground between minimalist approaches to
23joint action, according to which nothing more is needed for there to be a joint
24action than that a common effect be brought about by several agents’ actions and
25maximalist approaches that require joint actions to be intentionally joint.
26Minimalist approaches want to catch a wide net over joint intentions but offer
27no account of the intriguing phenomenon of joint intentionality; maximalist
28approaches target this phenomenon, but they either fail to fully capture it or
29capture it at too high a price.
30Being bent on thrift, I turn to economists to help me lower the costs. Specifically,
31I hope to get help from certain recent developments of game theory, known as
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32theories of team agency. Theories of team agency ( Q2Bacharach 2006; Sugden 1993,
332003; Gold and Sugden 2007, 2008) challenge the individualistic rationality
34assumptions of standard game theory and offer a theory of team reasoning aimed
35at capturing the modes of reasoning that can be used by people as a group. There are
36two parts to a theory of team agency. One is concerned with characterizing the
37patterns of inference people use (or should use) when reasoning as a group. The
38other is concerned with explaining how groups are formed. While team agency
39theorists tend to agree on how team reasoning should be characterized, they differ in
40their hypotheses about how groups or teams are formed. My primary interest here
41will be with Bacharach’s view that team formation and therefore team agency is the
42result of framing. My aim is not to argue that team agency can only be the result of
43framing as understood by Bacharach. I remain open to the possibility that there may
44be different routes to team-agency. Rather, I want to argue that insofar as framing is
45indeed one of the routes to team-agency, the toll demanded of us to take this route is
46less exacting than the toll we have to pay if we take other roads.
47In section 2, I characterize the minimalist and maximalist approaches to joint
48action and sketch some of the motivations underlying the maximalist approach. In
49section 3, I briefly review some of the leading accounts of joint actions within the
50maximalist tradition. In particular, I focus on Bratman’s and Gilbert’s distinctive
51accounts. While happy to admit that the shared intentions involved in joint action
52can sometimes take the forms proposed by Bratman or by Gilbert, I am skeptical that
53either account can apply to all joint actions (even as understood within the
54maximalist approach), Bratman’s account because it requires too much cognitive
55sophistication and Gilbert’s because it is overly normative. In section 4, I turn to
56theories of team agency. I first present some of the motivations for the idea of team
57reasoning, and then concentrate on Bacharach’s view on the role of frames in group
58formation. Finally, in section 5, I consider some of the advantages this proposal has
59over other theories of group formation.
602 Minimalist vs. Maximalist Approaches to Joint Action
61Through actions we bring about changes in the environment. Actions are typically
62described in terms of their effects. As a single action can have a wide range of
63effects, it is in principle describable in a host of ways. As a first pass, one may want
64to say that an event qualifies as a joint action if it is describable as the common
65effect of what several agents did; that is, none of the agents involved did on their
66own bring about this effect. Note that what is at stake here is not whether a single
67agent could in principle have brought about such an effect. Some actions may be
68essentially joint inasmuch as their outcome is not achievable by a single agent (e.g.,
69singing a duet or lifting a thousand pound object with bare hands), but this is not the
70case with all joint actions (e.g., I alone could have fixed the dinner we prepared
71together). Rather, what matters is that, in the case at hand, several agents did as a
72matter of fact contribute to the effect in terms of which the action is described. This
73we may call the common effect requirement.
74Not all the changes we bring about in our environment count as actions. When we
75sneeze and thus release millions of microbes in the air, we certainly have an effect on
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76our environment. Although there is a sense in which sneezing is something we do,
77few consider sneezing a genuine action. Central to the philosophy of action is the
78question of what distinguishes genuine actions from mere happenings and doings.
79Davidson (1980, essay 3) famously argued that for an event to qualify as an action it
80must be something the agent does that is intentional under some description. Many
81philosophers have agreed with him that there was an important tie between action
82and intention, although determining the exact nature of this tie has proven a difficult
83challenge and given rise to lively debates.
84The challenge is not confined to individual action; indeed, many would think
85that in joint action the problem strikes with a vengeance. Minimally, we want to
86exclude cases where a common effect is caused by doings we do not wish to
87count as actions. Suppose, for instance, that five people are stuck between floors
88in an airtight elevator in a building empty for the weekend and die there from
89asphyxiation. Suppose, further, that had fewer people been stuck in the elevator,
90they would have had enough oxygen to survive until help finally came. Although
91it is right to say that their dying was the common effect of their breathing away
92the limited supply of oxygen, we would be very reluctant to consider their dying
93from asphyxiation a joint action. To exclude such cases, it seems it is enough to
94require that the agent’s individual doings that together brought about the
95common effect be actions, that is, in Davidson’s parlance, that they be intentional
96under some description. Let us call this second requirement the individual
97intentional action requirement.
98Some may want to say, that for an event to qualify as a joint action it is both
99necessary and sufficient that it meets the common effect requirement together with
100the individual intentional action requirement. This seems to be the conception of
101joint action Butterfill (2010) has in mind when he argues that there can be joint
102actions without shared intentions. Specifically, Butterfill argues against certain
103further conditions being necessary conditions on joint action. In his view, agents
104participating in a joint action need not be aware of the joint-ness of the action, need
105not be aware of the other contributing agents as intentional agents, need not therefore
106act in part because of their awareness of joint-ness and of other’s agency, and finally
107need not be aware of the other agents’ attitudes toward the joint action. We may call
108this the minimalist view about joint action.
109In contrast to Butterfill’s, most philosophical accounts of joint actions incorporate,
110in one form or another, some or all of these further conditions, where to have a
111shared intention is to meet these requirements. Their insistence that these conditions
112be met seems to stem from a common concern and a common intuition. The concern
113is that we need a principled way of distinguishing genuine joint actions from mere
114joint happenings or joint doings. The intuition can be seen as an intuition as to how
115Davidson’s dictum that an action is something an agent does that is intentional under
116some description should be transposed when we move from individual to joint
117action. The intuition is that the relevant description in the case of joint action is a
118description of the action as joint. In others words, a joint action is something agents
119do that is intentional under some description of it as joint.
120Minimalist approaches allow us to catch a wider net over joint actions.
121Maximalists would protest that some of the actions caught in the net are not bona
122fide joint actions.
Framing Joint Action
JrnlID 13164_ArtID 52_Proof# 1 - 16/04/2011
AUTHOR'S PROOF
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
1233 Maximalist Approaches: Defining Shared Intentions
124Accounts of shared intentions1 are attempts to cash out what it takes for agents to act
125in a jointly intentional manner. These accounts all agree that joint actions are more
126than mere summations of individual actions and that therefore the intentionality in
127joint action cannot reduce to the intentionality of the individual actions that together
128contribute to the joint action. They all agree therefore that something more is needed.
129But what exactly is the right formula? This is where disagreements start and where
130different recipes for shared intentions are offered, mixing different ingredients in
131different ways.
132An early recipe was offered by Tuomela and Miller (1988). Essentially they
133proposed that shared intentions (we-intentions in their terminology) were analyzable
134as sets of individual intentions together with sets of mutual beliefs about the other
135agents’ intentions and beliefs. This analysis was criticized by Searle (1990) as failing
136to account for the cooperative character of joint actions. Searle used counter-
137examples to show that the existence of mutual beliefs among members of a group is
138not sufficient to ensure that their individual actions together constitute a joint action.
139Thus, for example, business school graduates who have been exposed to Adam
140Smith’s theory of the hidden hand may come to believe that the best way for
141somebody to help humanity is by pursuing his own selfish interests. Each may form
142a separate intention to thus help humanity by pursuing his own selfish interests and
143not cooperating with anybody and they may all have mutual beliefs to the effect that
144each has such an intention. In such a case, despite all the businessmen having the
145same goal as well as mutual beliefs about their respective intentions, there is no
146cooperation and no collective action. What they lack is an intention to cooperate
147mutually. Mutual beliefs among members of a group do not ensure the presence of
148such an intention.
149This critique of Searle’s may appear somewhat unfair as it neglects certain
150qualifications in Tuomela and Miller’s analysis. Tuomela and Miller insist that an
151agent’s individual intention is an intention to do his part “as his part” of the total
152action. The problem, though, is that this qualification can be understood in different
153ways. If “doing his part as his part” is simply construed to mean that the agent
154believes that others are also acting and contributing to a total outcome, then Searle’s
155counter-example is not deflected. If it is construed to mean doing his part as his part
156of the joint action, then circularity looms: the aim was to define joint actions in terms
157of we-intentions, but now joint actions are appealed to in defining we-intentions.2
158According to Searle, the cooperative dimension of joint actions can be captured
159only if it is accepted that the intentions attributable to the individuals involved in
1 Different authors use different terminologies, speaking of shared intentions, collective intentions, joint
intentions or we-intentions. Here I use these labels interchangeably, unless otherwise stated. Similarly,
‘shared agency’, ‘collective agency’, ‘joint agency’ and ‘team-agency’ are used interchangeably, unless
otherwise stated.
2 But see Tuomela (2005) for a rebuttal of Searle’s charge of vicious circularity. Importantly, Tuomela also
insists that his and Miller’s analysis was not meant as a reductive analysis of we-intentions. The I-mode/
we-mode distinction made by Tuomela (2006, 2007) and his discussion of full-blown we-intentions as
involving the we-mode make it clear that his aim is not reductive. Interestingly, there are important
commonalities between Tuomela’s notion of we-mode reasoning and Bacharach’s team-reasoning (Hakli
et al. 2010).
E. Pacherie
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160joint actions are different in type from the intentions attributable to those same
161individuals when they engage in individual actions. The idea then is that to account
162for cooperation we have to introduce a specific type of mental states: we-intentions.
163What needs to be spelled out is the sense in which we-intentions are special and,
164relatedly, the sense in which they can be said to imply cooperation. Prima facie,
165there are three ways in which we-intentions can be special. The first possibility is
166that what makes we-intentions special has to do with the type of entities they can be
167attributed to. The second is that what makes them special are features of their
168contents and thus that the dimension of cooperation is linked to specific features of
169these contents. Finally the third possibility is that rather than the contents or the
170possible bearers of we-intentions, it is the psychological mode itself—i.e., the fact
171that the psychological mode is that of we-intending instead of I-intending—that
172implies the notion of cooperation.
173Searle rejects the first option on the ground that it would force one to admit the
174existence of some forms of primitive collective entities, an ontological commitment
175he sees as unreasonable. For him, all intentional states are states of individuals.
176Thus, even we-intentions can only be had by individuals. Indeed, he claims that even
177a brain in a vat could have a we-intention. Searle also rejects the second option,
178claiming that the content of we-intentions is of a form already present in some
179complex cases of singular intentions, the content of which encompasses a by-means-
180of relation. The idea is that in the case of singular intention of, e.g., firing a gun by
181pulling the trigger, there is only one intention and one action, with the relation of the
182means-intention to the overall intention being only part-whole. Similarly, for Searle,
183in the case of collective actions, there is only one complex: the singular intentions of
184the participating agents are related to the collective intention as means to ends and
185this relation is simply part-whole. To borrow Searle’s example of two cooks, say
186Paul and Gilbert, preparing a hollandaise sauce together, the content of Paul’s
187we-intention would be something like ‘that we make the sauce by means of me
188steering’ and the content of Gilbert’s intention could be rendered as ‘that we make
189the sauce by means of me pouring’ Q3. It is important to note that there is nothing in the
190by-means-of relation per se that implies cooperation. For instance, I can intend that
191we go to the police station by means of me dragging you there, and clearly in such a
192case no cooperation need be involved. Thus, there is nothing in the analysis Searle
193offers of the form of the content of collective intentions that makes it necessary that
194the dimension of cooperation essential to collective intentions be reflected in
195their contents.
196The option Searle favors is the third one, namely, that what makes we-intentions
197special is the psychological mode itself, not the possible subjects of we-intentions
198nor their contents. More specifically, what is special about we-intentions is that they
199are mental states that “make reference to collectives where the reference to the
200collective lies outside the bracket that specifies the propositional content of the
201intentional state” (1990: 408). But what is it then about this distinctive kind of
202mental state that accounts for the dimension of cooperation that Searle says is
203essential to joint action? Unfortunately, Searle has very little to say in answer to that
204crucial question. Since, for Searle, a we-intention is a mental state an individual can
205enjoy independently of whether or not other individuals enjoy the same or similar
206we-intentions, cooperation can’t be construed as linked to the way the subject of a
Framing Joint Action
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207we-intention if formed. Second, as we have already noted, nothing in the structure of
208the content of we-intentions as laid out by Searle seems to capture the notion of
209cooperation, since there is nothing in the by-means-of relation per se that implies
210cooperation. According to Searle, in order to account for the cooperative character of
211we-intentions, we must appeal to Background capacities. What collective intentionality
212presupposes is “a Background sense of the other as a candidate for cooperative agency;
213that is, it presupposes a sense of others as more than mere conscious agents, indeed as
214actual or potential members of a cooperative activity” (1990: 414). According to Searle,
215such background capacities are not themselves representational; rather, they are sets of
216nonintentional or preintentional capacities that enable intentional states. In other
217words, they are biological phenomena rather than intentional phenomena. There Searle
218comes to rest, his motto seemingly being that what cannot be described in intentional
219terms, a philosopher must pass over in silence.
220Though sharing his intuition that we-intentions cannot be reduced to summations
221of individual intentions (even supplemented with mutual beliefs), many philosophers
222regret that Searle does not characterize we-intentions more fully. Here are three of
223the main complaints. First, as pointed out by Gilbert (2007), even an account of
224we-intentions that takes them to be states of individuals (an assumption Gilbert
225doesn’t share), needs to say something about how the we-intentions of several
226agents should fit together for them to successfully perform a joint action. Yet,
227Searle doesn’t. Second, as remarked by Bardsley (2007) and Gold and Sugden
228(2008), Searle also fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of the sense in which
229individual intentions derive from we-intentions. Finally, Searle is unduly hasty in
230sweeping cooperation under the rug of Background presuppositions and biological
231phenomena. One the one hand, it is controversial to exclude at the outset the
232possibility that cooperation could be characterized at least in part in intentional
233terms. On the other hand, even if our sense of others as candidates for cooperative
234agency is strongly linked to Background capacities, it should be possible to say
235more about what these capacities are and under what conditions they are put into
236play. As we shall see in section 4, Bacharach’s framing theory offers insights into
237these questions.
238Before turning to the theory of team agency, I want to consider two further
239accounts of shared intentions, offered respectively by Bratman and Gilbert. Neither
240Bratman nor Gilbert agrees with Searle that shared intentions are a sui generis type
241of mental state attributable to a single individual agent. For Bratman, in the same
242way that it takes two to tango, it takes (at least) two to share an intention: a
243shared intention is a structure of interconnected intentions of individual agents.
244For Gilbert, shared intentions can only be attributed to a group as such, to what
245she calls a plural subject.
246Bratman’s approach to shared intentions is a constructivist approach that builds
247on his planning theory of individual agency. His aim is to provide sufficient
248conditions for shared intentions using the conceptual and normative resources of this
249planning theory. In other words, he thinks we can account for the joint-ness of
250shared intentions if we construe them as structures of suitably inter-related intentions
251and other attitudes of participants, where the component intentions of the individuals
252belong, pace Searle, to the ordinary brand of intentions, only with special and
253distinctive contents and interrelations. He also thinks that the social norms that apply
E. Pacherie
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254to and guide shared intentions can be shown to emerge from the norms that govern
255individual planning agency.
256Bratman (2009a, b) proposes that shared intention involves the following main
257building blocks:
258(1) Intentions on the part of each in favor of the joint activity.
259(2) Interlocking intentions: each intends that the joint activity go in part by way of
260the relevant intentions of each of the other participants.
261(3) Intentions in favor of meshing subplans: each intends that the joint activity
262proceeds by way of subplans of the participants that are co-realizable and can
263be consistently agglomerated.
264(4) Disposition to help if needed: given that the contribution of the other
265participants to the joint activity is part of what each intend, and given the
266demands of means-end coherence and of consistency that apply to intentions,
267each is under rational pressure to help others fulfill their role if needed.
268(5) Interdependence in the persistence of each participant’s relevant intention: each
269continues to intend the joint activity if and only if (they believe) the other
270participants continue to so intend.
271(6) Joint-action-tracking mutual responsiveness: each is responsive to each in
272relevant subsidiary intentions and in relevant actions in a way that tracks the
273joint action.
274(7) Common knowledge among all participants of all these conditions.
275I won’t comment extensively on each of these conditions here, but I’ll offer some
276remarks. First, although the first condition refers to the joint action, it is not the
277condition that is supposed to account for the joint-ness of the activity in the strong
278sense in which we are interested. If it were, the account would be circular. Indeed,
279Bratman takes care to point out that the concept a joint activity that figures in the
280contents of the intentions in (1) should be understood in a way that is neutral with
281respect to shared intentionality. Instead, it is condition (2) that is the most central to
282Bratman’s account of shared intentionality. It is the fact that for each participant, the
283content of their intention refers to the role of the intentions of other participants that,
284for him, captures the intentional joint-ness of their actions. It should also be noted
285that conditions (3), (4) and (6) can be derived from condition (2) taken together with
286the norms already associated with individual planning and acting. It should also be
287remarked that conditions (1) and (2) both violate the own action condition, i.e. the
288constraint that one can only intend one’s own actions, with condition (1) ranging
289over others’ actions and condition (2) over others’ intentions. However, Bratman
290(1992) argues that conditions on intending that are weaker than conditions on
291intending to. Roughly put, for one to intend that A, it is not necessary that one
292suppose this intention will lead one to do A, it suffices that one suppose it will lead
293one to do something that has an influence on whether or not A obtains. Condition (6)
294clarifies the nature of this influence: each believes that his or her intention controls
295the intentions and actions of others by way of its support of the persistence of the
296other’s relevant intentions.
297Bratman’s ambition in giving this account is avowedly modest. His interest is in
298cases of small-scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric
299authority relations. He purports to offer sufficient conditions for shared intentions
Framing Joint Action
JrnlID 13164_ArtID 52_Proof# 1 - 16/04/2011
AUTHOR'S PROOF
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
300rather than necessary and sufficient conditions, allowing therefore for possible
301alternative constructions and leaving open the possibility that shared intention is
302multiply realizable. There are indeed reasons to think that, even leaving aside cases
303where asymmetric authority relations are present, alternative construals of shared
304intentions will be needed. As we shall see in section 4, there are situations where
305agents cannot influence others’ intentions and thus where some of the conditions
306specified by Bratman cannot be met and where joint action is nevertheless possible.
307Another limitation to the scope of Bratman’s accounts comes from the fact that in his
308construction, the materials come cheap (it makes do with ordinary intentions and
309with the normativity already present in individual planning agency), but their
310assemblage is costly and demands cognitively sophisticated agents. As pointed out
311by Tollefsen (2005) and Pacherie and Dokic (2006), Bratman’s analysis requires that
312the participating agents have concepts of mental states, since each participant should
313represent that the other participants have intentions and other attitudes relevant to the
314joint activity. It requires full-fledged meta-representational abilities insofar as the
315contents of the intentions of each participant make reference to both their own
316intentions and the intentions of the other participants. The imposition of such strong
317cognitive requirements would imply that animals and small children who lack
318altogether or have not yet fully developed mentalizing and meta-representational
319abilities as well as adequate mastery of the norms of practical rationality associated
320with planning cannot share intentions and engage in joint action. Although it is
321currently debated whether non-human animals ever engage in true joint action,
322existing evidence indicates that children clearly do and do so before they acquire the
323kind of cognitive sophistication Bratman’s analysis suggests is required (Rakoczy
3242006, 2007; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007; Tomasello et al. 2005; Warneken et al.
3252006, Warneken and Tomasello 2007).
326As an account targeting small-scale shared intentional activity by suitably
327cognitively sophisticated agents in situations where they are in a position to
328mutually influence their intentions and related attitudes, Bratman’s account has many
329assets. By conceiving of shared intentions as an interlocking web of intentions of
330individuals, it moves away from the classical reductive analyses of collective action,
331since it maintains that the crucial link among the attitudes of agents involved in joint
332activity is not just a matter of mutual belief or mutual knowledge is not sufficient to
333ensure that intention is shared or collective. At the same time, the account is
334metaphysically and normatively parsimonious. On Bratman’s view, it is not
335necessary to introduce, as Searle does, a new sui generis kind of mental state,
336ordinary intentions do the trick. It is not necessary to introduce new substrata to
337whom shared intentions would be ascribed; instead, it is sufficient that we ascribe a
338set of intentions, seriatim, to individual human agents. It is not necessary to see the
339social normativity characteristic of shared intentions as a basic, non-reducible form
340of normativity; rather this social normativity emerges from the normativity already
341associated with individual planning agency.
342In Gilbert’s view, however, this parsimony of Bratman’s account is inopportune.
343Participation in a shared intention involves mutual entitlements to others playing
344their parts and, correlatively, mutual obligations, each to the other, to act as
345appropriate to the shared intention. For Gilbert (1997, 2009), the entitlements and
346obligations inherent in shared intentions cannot be understood as moral in kind and
E. Pacherie
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347cannot be understood as emerging from the norms associated with individual
348planning agency. Rather, the social normativity associated with shared intention is of
349a sui generis kind. As Gilbert sees it, to account for this special normativity, shared
350intentions have to be construed in terms of joint commitments:
3512Persons P1 and P2 have a shared intention to do A if and only if they are
353jointly committed to intending as a body to do A. (Gilbert 1997: 73)
3545Gilbert describes the idea of a joint commitment as an analogue of the idea of
356personal commitment in individual agency. When an individual has formed an
357intention or made a decision, he has in virtue of this intention or decision sufficient
358reason to act in a certain way; that is, all else being equal, he is rationally required to
359act in that way. Thus, a personal intention or decision entails a personal commitment
360to act in a certain way. Analogously, a joint decision or intention to act involves a
361joint commitment. Importantly, however, Gilbert insists that joint commitments
362are not concatenations of personal commitments. Rather, in the basic case, a joint
363commitment is created when each of two or more people openly expresses his
364personal readiness jointly with the other to commit them all in a certain way and
365it is common knowledge between them that all have expressed their readiness.
366The author of a joint commitment comprises those who jointly committed
367themselves by their concordant expressions. Together they constitute the plural
368subject of the commitment. In Gilbert’s view, plural subjects and joint commitments are
369indissociably linked: there can be no plural subjects without joint commitments
370and there can be no joint commitments that are not the commitments of a
371plural subject.
372Gilbert (2009) glosses what she means by “intending as a body to do A” as
373emulating, as far as possible, by virtue of the actions of each, a single body (or
374agent) that intends to do the thing in question. This in itself is not very illuminating.
375One way to flesh out the idea of “acting as a body” is in terms of satisfying the type
376of rationality constraints that bear on individual agency. To intend as a body would
377then be a matter of acting in such a way that the actions of each together satisfy
378norms of consistency, agglomeration and means-end coherence. This would involve,
379in Bratman’s terms, commitments to mutual compatibility of relevant sub-plans,
380commitments to mutual support, and joint-action tracking mutual responsiveness.
381If we interpret her idea of “acting as a body” in this way, Gilbert may well be
382willing to accept that some of the normativity present in shared intentions emerges
383from the normativity already present in individual agency. But still, she would
384disagree with Bratman that all the normativity essential to shared intentions can be
385so derived. For her, mutual obligations and entitlements are part and parcel of what
386constitutes a shared intention and can only be accounted for in terms of joint
387commitments. For Bratman, although common, these obligations and entitlements
388are not essential to shared intentions and when present can be usually understood as
389belonging to the familiar moral kind. Here the disagreement threatens to turn into a
390battle of intuitions. Gilbert (1997, 2009) takes the claim that shared intentions
391essentially engage non-moral mutual obligations and entitlements as intuitively
392obvious and offers examples rather than arguments in support for this claim.
393Bratman (2009b) replies with counter-examples where mutual obligations of
394performance appear to be absent.
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395One may also question Gilbert’s construal of the link between a plural subject and
396a joint commitment. Gilbert sees them as the two sides of the same coin: joint
397commitments are commitments of plural subjects and only when there is a joint
398commitment is there a plural subject. It seems one could accept the first claim while
399rejecting the second. Even if it is accepted that when we jointly commit to intending
400to A, each of us is committed as a member of the group and as such incurs
401obligations and entitlements, it may be that membership in a group is not a matter of
402joint commitment. I may for instance make a personal decision to become a member
403of an already existing group (as when one joins a political party or the neighborhood
404association) or I may simply conceive of myself as a member of a group. To the
405extent that membership in a group is a matter of personal decision, it is a
406commitment I can rescind on my own. To the extent that it is a matter of self-
407conception, it can cease if one’s self-conception changes. If we accept that
408membership in a group or plural subject, on the one hand, and joint commitment
409to intending that A, on the other, can be separate processes, the former a precondition
410of the latter, then it should be possible to accommodate Gilbert’s claim that we incur
411obligations as members of a plural subject committed to a certain course of action,
412while denying that anyone has an obligation to be and remain a member of the plural
413subject or an entitlement to the membership of others. On this view, those who fail to
414satisfy their obligations as members of a group certainly forfeit their entitlement to
415be considered members of a group, but the group has no right to insist that they
416remain members of the group despite themselves. I strongly suspect that reluctance
417to accept Gilbert’s stance on plural subject and joint commitments is at bottom
418motivated by the conviction that sociality should not be had at the expense of
419personal autonomy.
420Gilbert purports to provide individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
421on shared intention: to wit, two or more people share an intention to do A if and only
422if they are jointly committed to intending as a body to do A. The price to pay for this
423ambition is thus the introduction of the notion of joint commitment which Gilbert
424conceives as a basic, non-reducible kind of commitment. For her, a joint
425commitment creates for those jointly committed a set of obligations (and
426corresponding entitlements), that can neither be construed as forms of moral
427obligations, nor be derived from the constraints inherent in individual rational
428planning. Their normativity is therefore neither that of moral norms neither that of
429norms of individual rationality. It is rather a sui generis form of social normativity.
430The notion of joint commitment is thus basic or non-reducible insofar as joint
431commitments are the source of this sui generis form of social normativity. One may
432fear with Bratman that, with this notion of joint commitment, her account takes on
433board more normativity than is strictly needed. One may also question the strength
434of the link between the notions of joint commitment and of plural subject. Loosening
435this link may allow us to pare down the social normativity in shared intention to
436more acceptable levels, while preserving the gist of Gilbert’s insight that the social
437normativity in shared intention is sui generis. But if plural subjects are not (or not
438always) explicable in terms of joint commitments, we will need alternative accounts
439of their formation. In contrast to Gilbert’s, Bratman’s account aims at metaphysical
440and normative parsimony, but the downside of this parsimony is cognitive
441prodigality. In addition, both accounts require that some form of communication,
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442verbal or otherwise, be possible between agents, allowing them to influence each
443other’s intentions or to form explicit or tacit agreements to jointly commit
444themselves to doing something together. Thus, they cannot in principle account for
445the emergence of shared agency in situations where agents cannot communicate or
446influence each other in other ways. While there is no doubt that communication can
447support and facilitate cooperation and shared agency (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al.
4481992), it is questionable whether communication is a necessary precondition of
449shared agency.
450In contrast, theories of team agency, to which I now turn, are motivated in part by
451the need to explain how coordination and shared agency can emerge, absent any
452possibility of communication between the agents. As I hope to show, they can also
453help us build an account of shared intentions that doesn’t assume extreme cognitive
454sophistication or wholesale normativity.
4554 Team Reasoning
456Theories of team agency where developed by economists Sugden (1993, 2003) and
457Bacharach (2006) in response to problems that arise in classical game theory.
458Classical game theory assumes that the players of a game are ideally rational agents
459and have perfect information: they maximize expected utility, given the expected
460behavior of others, and they have common knowledge of the game itself and of the
461rationality of other players. One central motivation for theories of team reasoning is
462that there are games that create problems for conventional game theory. In these
463games, there exists some strategy that is arguably rational and that many people
464adopt in real life, but which can’t be explained or predicted as rational by classical
465game theory.
466One such puzzle is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a typical version of which is given in
467Fig. 1. For each player, defect is the dominant strategy (i.e., regardless of what the
468opponent does, defect earns a higher pay-off than cooperate). Conventional game
469theory, in its explanatory form, therefore predicts that both players will choose defect
470and, in its normative form, prescribes that they do. Yet, the players would be better
471off, if they had both chosen cooperate. A substantial number of people see that,
472since in experiments in which people play the Prisoner’s Dilemma for money,
473anonymously and without repetition, between 40 and 50% of the participants choose
474cooperate (Sally 1995).3
475A second puzzle is the game of Hi-Lo, a version of which is given in Fig. 2. In
476this game players must choose between two actions, a and b. They receive
477something only if they both choose the same, but they get more if they both choose a
478then if they both choose b. This puzzle is, if anything, even more puzzling than the
479first one. It is intuitively obvious that the rational choice for both players is a. Yet,
480conventional game theory has no explanation of what makes the choice of a rational.
481All the theory says is that if either expects the other to play a, then a is the rational
3 See also the empirical results of Colman et al. (2008) showing that in social dilemma games most players
prefer team-reasoning strategies to strategies supporting unique Nash equilibria, although individually
rational players should choose equilibrium strategies.
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482thing to do, but also that if either expect the other to play b, then b is the rational
483thing to do.
484Many game theorists have interpreted these results as showing that the rationality
485assumptions of classical game theory were too strong. If the assumption of perfect
486rationality is relaxed it is not difficult to construct theories that purport to explain the
487choice of a. Yet, it may seem counterintuitive to have to invoke failures of rationality
488in order to yield a solution to an apparently trivial problem of coordination. In
489contrast, theories of team agency retain the classical rationality assumptions; what
490they think is wrong with the classical game theory is its focus on individual choice.
491The key move in these theories consists in replacing the question “What should I
492do?”, asked separately by each individual, with the question “What should we do?”.
493If instead of reasoning as separate individuals, the players reason as members of a
494team, then it will be collectively rational for them to choose (a,a) over (b,b), (a,b)
495and (b,a) and, similarly to choose (cooperate, cooperate) over (defect, defect),
496(cooperate, defect) or (defect, cooperate).
497To articulate this insight, a theory of team agency should do two things: (1)
498provide a theory of team-reasoning, i.e. an analysis of the reasoning an individual
499uses, if, thinking of herself as a member of a group, he or she asks the question,
500“What should we do?” instead of the question “What should I do?”; and (2) provide
501a theory of team formation, i.e., explain how the individual comes to ask one of
502these questions rather than the other?. A complete theory of team agency should thus
503have two complementary parts.
504Roughly, as Bacharach puts it, “somebody ‘team-reasons’ if she works out the
505best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then
506does her part in it” (2006: 121). What a theory of team reasoning does is refine and
507spell this out in a number of ways, characterizing the inference schemas that capture
508the modes of reasoning involved in team-reasoning.4 I won’t dwell on this aspect of
509the theory here. Rather, I concentrate on the issue of group formation, or of how
510individual agents come to identify with a group, and more specifically on
511Bacharach’s treatment of this issue.
512For Bacharach, thinking of oneself as a member of a group is a matter of framing.
513A frame is a set of concepts of descriptors used when thinking about a situation. To
514take a trivial example, thinking of a glass as half-empty or as half-full are alternative
515ways in which one can frame a given situation, and whether one uses one frame or
516the other may have important consequences for how one behaves with respect to this
517situation. According to Bacharach, whether an agent identifies with a group or not is
518a matter of what frame she uses to represent herself and the agents with whom she is
4 See, for instance, Gold and Sugden (2007, 2008) for a presentation and discussion of those reasoning
schemas.
Player 2 
Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 2,2 0,3 
Player 1 Defect 3,0 1,1 
Q4 Fig. 1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
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519interacting, and the frame she uses will determine the logic by which she will reason
520about what to do. Bacharach takes group identification to be a basic human
521propensity. His concern is with identifying conditions for the production of group
522identification.
523Bacharach relies on theories of group identification developed in social
524psychology. According to Q5Brewer and Gardner (1996), people don’t have a single
525self-concept, but rather a range a self-representations falling within three main
526categories: personal, relational and collective. The personal self is a self-conception
527as having a unique, differentiated identity. The relational self is a self-conception
528derived from connections and role relationships with significant others. The
529collective self is a self-conception defined in terms of membership in social
530categories or groups. Self-conception is self-framing, and like other forms of framing
531has characteristic instability and context-dependence. Psychologists have identified a
532number of conditions that tend to produce group identification, including belonging
533to the same social category (e.g. being a woman, a philosopher, a Parisian), to the
534same ad hoc category (being born on the 1st of June), face-to-faced contact, “we”
535language, shared experience (e.g., being an air crash survivor), having common
536interests, being subject to a common fate, interdependence, and a competing outside
537group (e.g. analytic vs. continental philosophers). Whether a situation promotes
538group identification and to which group depends on whether the situation presents
539some of these properties and whether they are salient enough to prime the
540corresponding group frame.
541The two features most relevant to inducing a “we” frame in the kinds of games
542Bacharach is interested in are common interests and interdependence. In Bacharach’s
543definition (2006: 82), two players have common interests if, given their options for
544action, there are at least two possible outcomes, such that the interests of both are
545better served in one than in the other. On this definition, having common interests is
546not synonymous with having identical interests and is indeed compatible with the
547players also having very different interests. Importantly, this is the case in the
548Prisoner’s Dilemma, where with regard to the two remaining possible outcomes, the
549interests of the players are in conflict.
550The second important feature that can induce group identification in games is
551strong interdependence. Informally, there is interdependence in a game if there is an
552outcome of common interest that can only be achieved together, and there is strong
553independence, if this outcome is not preferred by both agents to all other feasible
554outcomes. According to Bacharach if the two features of common interest and strong
555interdependence are present in a situation and salient enough to be perceived, they
556can induce a “we” frame (i.e. self-identification as a member of the team of players).
557In the Hi-Lo game these two features are present and are highly salient, a “we”
558frame, hence team-reasoning, will normally be induced. The situation in the
Player 2 
2,2 0,0
Player 1 
0,0 1,1 
a                  b 
a
b
Fig. 2 The game of Hi-Lo
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559Prisoner’s Dilemma is more ambiguous; like the duck-rabbit illusion, it can be seen
560in two different ways. On the one hand, common interest and strong interdependence
561are present and become salient when one concentrates on the main diagonal
562((cooperate, cooperate) and (defect, defect)). On the other hand, if one looks at the
563outcomes on the other diagonal ((cooperate, defect) and (defect, cooperate)), one
564sees a conflict of interest and the possibility of being double-crossed by the other
565player if one chooses cooperate. It is therefore important to stress that for Bacharach
566the presence of common interests and strong interdependence is no guarantee that a
567“we” frame will be used. What frame is induced turns on the relative salience of
568various features of a situation and on the strength of their tendency to stimulate or
569inhibit group identification.
570Bacharach also insists that the use of a frame is not a matter of choice. In the same
571way that you do not choose to see the duck-rabbit figure as a duck rather than as a
572rabbit, you don’t choose to think of yourself as a member of team rather than as a
573separate individual. This claim may be too strong as it stands. While it may well be
574true that we do not normally choose to see the duck-rabbit figure as a duck rather
575than as a rabbit, once we are aware of the ambiguous nature of the figure, we are in a
576position to gain some control over whether we see it as a duck or a rabbit. We have
577some voluntary control over our attention and can use it to manipulate salience. We
578can choose, for instance, to focus our attention on those features of the figure that
579make the duck interpretation more probable. It seems in principle possible that we
580could manipulate our self-conception in a similar way. I suspect that at bottom what
581Bacharach really opposed was the idea that the adoption of a frame can be a matter
582of rational choice. His reluctance appears founded, if we consider what a meta-level
583version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. By that I mean a version of the dilemma where
584the choice is not directly between cooperating and defecting but between asking the
585question “What should we do?” (We-question) or the question “What should I do?”
586(I-question) in order to solve the problem. If a player chooses the We-question, she
587will select the (cooperate, cooperate) option and do her part in it, namely cooperate.
588If a player chooses the I-question, she will as a result choose defect. As shown in
589Fig. 3, the payoff matrix of the meta-level version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is
590exactly the same of the payoff matrix of the original Prisoner’s Dilemma. We are
591thus back to square one. If the players ask the question “What question should I
592ask?”, the answer is that the I-question should be chosen, but if they ask the Q6question
593“What question should we ask?”, the answer is the We-question.
594Thus, on pain of infinite regress, the cost to be paid for preserving the rationality
595assumptions of the classical game theory while resolving its puzzles, is in accepting
596that the adoption of one mode of reasoning over another cannot be a matter of
597rational choice. This, of course, is not to say that adopting one frame over another in
We-question I-question 
We-question (C,C), (C,C) 
2,2 
(C,C), D 
0,3 Player 1 
I-question D, (C,C) 
3,0 
D, D 
1,1 
Player 2 Fig. 3 The meta-version of the
prisoner’s dilemma
E. Pacherie
JrnlID 13164_ArtID 52_Proof# 1 - 16/04/2011
AUTHOR'S PROOF
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
598given situations cannot be externally or evolutionary rational (be to the agent’s
599benefit and enhance fitness). Indeed, it should be noted that in his book Bacharach’s
600surveys a body of evolutionary theory that provides evidence that humans have
601evolved to be cooperators and that the psychological mechanisms that support group
602identification are the proximate mechanisms that make cooperation possible.
603Going over these evolutionary considerations goes beyond the scope of the
604present paper. What I want to consider in the remainder of this paper are the new
605perspectives on shared agency offered by Bacharach’s view of group identification
606as a matter of framing.
6075 New Perspectives on Shared Agency
608Among the views surveyed in section 3, the one Bacharach is closest to in spirit is
609probably Searle’s. Bacharach’s theory can be interpreted as fleshing out Searle’s
610insight that collective intentionality presupposes a sense of the other as a candidate
611for cooperative agency. Bacharach’s discussion of group identification aims in effect
612at spelling out at least certain of the production conditions for this phenomenon and
613at characterizing its effects, most importantly changes in modes of reasoning.
614Another important commonality between Searle and Bacharach is that for both
615shared agency remains vested in individuals. For Bacharach, shared agency does not
616involve transferring agency from individuals to plural subjects; rather it is a matter of
617individuals conceiving of themselves as members of a group and engaging in
618team-reasoning. It is, so to speak, a within-subject transformation of agency. Yet, for
619there to be an actual shared intention, several agents must engage in team-reasoning.
620Thus, in Bacharach’s framework, a shared intention would be characterized as follows:
621Two persons P1 and P2 share an intention to A, if:
622a. each has a self-conception as a member of the team consisting of P1 and P2
623(collective self-framing);
624b. each reasons that A is the best choice of action for all members of the team
625(team-reasoning); and
626c. each therefore intends to do his part of A (participatory intention).
627One important advantage of the theory of team agency is that it allows
628cooperation to emerge even in situations where agents cannot communicate or
629influence each other in other ways. In particular, in the one-shot version of the
630Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Hi-Lo game the theory of team-reasoning aims at
631solving, the players are not able to influence each other. This is in contrast to both
632Bratman’s and Gilbert’s theories of shared intention. As team-reasoning theorists
633have pointed out (Bacharach 2006: 138 sq; Bardsley 2007; Gold and Sugden 2007,
6342008), in Bratman’s account, the decisions and actions of the agents are governed by
635classical (i.e. individualist) canons of rationality. Unless they can influence each
636others’ intentions through their own intentions or actions, they won’t be able to
637rationally generate determinate expectations about others’ actions. Thus, in situations
638where agents are unable to influence each other, there is no way they can rationally
639decide to cooperate. Although this is less frequently noted (but see Bardsley 2007:
640154), Gilbert’s theory faces a similar problem. Once they have formed a joint
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641commitment, agents can, as a plural subject, rationally decide in favor of the
642cooperative option. Yet, it is through explicit or tacit agreements that they form joint
643commitments, and these agreements require some form of prior interaction.
644The fact that on Bacharach’s theory group identification and team-reasoning are
645the result of self-framing and need not involve joint commitments also deflates the
646normative import of shared agency. An agent whose current self-conception is as a
647member of a team is subject to the norms of team-reasoning. This entails
648obligations to herself as a member of the team (she will be rationally required to
649do what team-reasoning tells her is her part of the best combination of actions for
650members of the team), but not necessarily obligations to others or entitlements to
651their performance. Her engaging in team-reasoning may well lead her to form
652expectations as to what others will do, but expectations are not entitlements. This
653is not to say that forming joint commitments may not be a very efficient way to
654induce group identification, hence team-reasoning and joint action, but to say that
655this is not the only way.
656Finally, thinking of joint actions and shared intentions in terms of frames allows
657us to considerably reduce the cognitive demands we impose on agents to be
658participants to joint actions. Recall that on Bratman’s analysis, agents must have
659full-fledged mentalizing capacities in order to form shared intentions: they must have
660concepts of mental states, since each participant should represent that the other
661participants have intentions and other attitudes relevant to the joint activity, and they
662must have well-developed meta-representational abilities insofar as the contents of
663the intentions of each participant make reference to both their own intentions and the
664intentions of the other participants.
665Bacharach’s version of team-agency theory is also less demanding than Sugden’s
666version of team-agency theory. Although both agree that an intention is a shared
667intention when it is arrived at through a process of team-reasoning and that group
668identification is a prerequisite of team-reasoning, they hold different views of what
669leads to group identification. For Bacharach, group-identification is a framing
670phenomenon automatically induced by psychological mechanisms. Frames are not
671chosen and an agent therefore does not choose to engage in team-reasoning rather
672than in individual reasoning. In contrast, for Sugden (2003), team-reasoning is
673merely a ‘logic’ among others, that is, an internally consistent system of axioms and
674inference rules. Whether one endorses a particular logic, thereby accepting as true
675any conclusions that can be derived within it, is a matter of choice. On Sugden’s
676assurance view of team-reasoning, it is rational for an actor to endorse a principle of
677team reasoning which prescribes acting as a team member only conditional on
678assurance that others have endorsed the same principle. For the necessary assurance
679to be provided, Sugden requires that for all members of the group there be common
680reason to believe that each member of the group endorses and acts on team reason.
681With respect to the cognitive demands imposed on agents, Sugden’s position is thus
682intermediate between Bratman’s and Bacharach’s. In contrast to Bratman, Sugden
683does not require that the contents of the intentions of each actor make reference to
684both their own intentions and the intentions of the other actors. In contrast to
685Bacharach, Sugden requires assurance, that is, he requires that actors have reasons to
686believe that each other endorses team-reasoning, that each other has reason to
687believe that each other endorses team-reasoning, and so on.
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688On Bacharach’s version of team-agency theory, assurance plays no essential role.
689Psychological mechanisms of group identification can lead people to spontaneously
690team-reason, without first considering whether others will be so inclined. Having
691team-reasoning depend on such psychological mechanisms makes engagement in
692joint action much less cognitively costly. Group identification involves sensitivity to
693certain features of situations, including the presence of common interests and
694interdependence. The detection of common interests and interdependence presupposes
695some capacity to represent others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents.
696Many developmental psychologists would agree that agency-detection and goal-
697attribution are precursors of mindreading and that intention and desire-ascription
698are early components of mindreading.5 Yet, demanding that agents have these
699skills is a far cry from demanding that they have full-fledged mindreading abilities,
700involving mastery of a fuller range of mental concepts and sophisticated reasoning
701about intentions and other attitudes.
702The modesty of the demands made by on mindreading abilities is not offset by
703extreme demands on reasoning skills. The basic inferential principles used in team-
704reasoning are quite analogous to the inferential principles used in individual
705reasoning. This is not to say that team-agency theory has no use for sophisticated
706mindreading abilities or reasoning skills; only that those skills are not a prerequisite
707of shared agency. Indeed, more robust mentalizing capacities may be needed when
708situations are less immediately transparent than they are typically assumed to be in
709game-theory. Normal form game matrices present combinations of actions with their
710associated utilities, thus presupposing that the problems associated with working out
711what the different action alternatives are and what their respective utilities are have
712already been solved. In such games, it is therefore typically obvious for the agents
713what action profile maximizes the utility of the team, and what component of this
714profile each should perform. In many real-life situations, however, working out one’s
715part isn’t trivial. Even as simple a situation as Searle’s case of the two cooks
716preparing a sauce together raises problems: both may have reached, through team
717reasoning, the decision to prepare the sauce together, but this in itself doesn’t make it
718obvious who should do the pouring and who the stirring. In other cases, it may not
719be obvious to the agents not just who should do what, but also how they should
720proceed to achieve their shared goal. Experimental work on joint action in young
721children suggests that what limits what they can do jointly is not their inability to
722share goals, but rather their very rudimentary skills at coordinating their actions
723towards a shared goal (Warneken and Tomasello 2007). It is probable that when we
724move beyond very simple or routine joint actions, the appropriate meshing of
725subplans often requires that agents take into consideration the beliefs and intentions
726of their partners. The need to engage more robust mentalizing abilities also arises
727when there are discrepancies between our expectations about our partners’ actions
728and what they actually do. Although, according to Bacharach’s version of team-
5 A range of researchers have argued that infants are sensitive to some aspects of goal-directed activity and
discriminate between intentional and accidental actions (Gergely et al. 1995; Csibra 2008; Tomasello and
Rakoczy 2003; Woodward 1998; Woodward and Sommerville 2000). Developmental psychologists also
widely agree that children’s understanding of desire and intention develops earlier than their understanding
of belief (Baron-Cohen 1993; Bartsch and Q7Wellman 1995). There is also evidence that initially children
have difficulty clearly distinguishing intentions from desires (Astington 1991, 1994; Perner 1991).
Framing Joint Action
JrnlID 13164_ArtID 52_Proof# 1 - 16/04/2011
AUTHOR'S PROOF
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
729agency theory, agents need not have expectations about others’ actions, intentions
730and beliefs in order to team-reason, team reasoning may yield such expectations.
731When they are not met, it can be important to understand why, and mindreading can
732help us make sense of these discrepancies. Finally, as pointed out by Hakli et al.
733(2010), Bacharach’s theory takes group preferences for granted. Yet, it may not be
734obvious what utility values individuals associate to various outcomes or how
735individual preference orderings relate to collective preference orderings.
736Bacharach’s theory doesn’t make other theories of shared agency superfluous or
737redundant. It should certainly be allowed that joint actions can involve shared
738intentions with the characteristics described by Bratman or with the properties
739insisted on by Gilbert. At the same time, it casts doubt on the idea that either account
740delivers a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for shared intentions. If as the
741team-agency theory suggests, shared agency can be the result of framing rather than
742be produced by joint commitment, then shared intentions need not be as normatively
743loaded as Gilbert argues. If shared agency can be the result of framing, it needs not
744require the type of cognitive sophistication Bratman’s theory demands. Bacharach’s
745approach thus allows us to reduce both the normative and the cognitive cost of
746shared intentions, while still allowing us to capture a form of joint action more
747substantial than what the minimalist approach is content with. Thus also, while the
748primary motivation for team agency theory was quite independent of developmental
749issues, it offers new perspectives on the development of shared agency.
750Yet, Bacharach’s theory is not a panacea and has limitations of its own. First, it is
751not always out in the open what the action alternatives are and what the group
752preferences are. Bacharach’s theory should therefore be supplemented with accounts
753of how action alternatives and group preferences can be worked out by agents.
754Second, although Bacharach’s idea that group identification is a matter of framing,
755hence that team reasoning can be spontaneous, is an important insight, I am not sure
756we should follow him in thinking that team-reasoning can never be a matter of
757choice. It seems in principle possible to exert some voluntary control, direct or
758indirect, over the psychological processes involved in self-framing once we become
759aware of their role. Finally, an account of shared intention should tell us not just
760what it takes to engage in joint action, but also what it takes to ensure it is
761successfully performed. Team agency theory allows us to understand how it is
762possible for people to rationally decide to pursue a shared goal. Yet, it has very little
763so say about how in many real-life situations people succeed in coordinating their
764actions towards a shared goal. To answer this question, we must appeal to resources
765that go beyond what the theory has to offer. These further resources may include
766further mindreading skills, and also, but this is another story, other kinds of
767mechanisms allowing individuals to share representations, to predict actions, and to
768integrate the actions of self and other.6
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